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Tamara Kayali Browne’s proposal for a DSM Ethics Review Panel (hereafter, “the Panel”) 
conceives of a state-sponsored panel of academic experts – philosophers, sociologists and 
bioethicists – dealing in a reflective, systematic, and standardized manner with the “value 
judgements” that are an “integral and unavoidable part of psychiatric nosology” (Browne 
2015, 6). The Panel would consider existing and new diagnostic categories, and issue 
authoritative vetoes and/or modifications as appropriate. Browne asserts that “it should not be 
necessary to have protests and political activism, such as that involved in removing 
homosexuality from the DSM, in order for the status quo to be reassessed” (Browne 2015, 
13). The Panel, in other words, is intended to do via expert deliberation what has been done 
previously via the apparently lesser methods of “protests and political activism”. 
 My criticism of Browne’s article concerns its historiographic argumentation. To 
exemplify the Panel’s work, she offers a counterfactual history of Premenstrual Dysphoric 
Disorder (PMDD). The selection of PMDD – rather than, say, Homosexuality – is unhelpful 
to her case, and her narrative of a counterfactual deliberation on PMDD does not sufficiently 
distinguish, nor defend, its historical probability. 
Browne lists three areas which the Panel of philosophers, sociologists, and 
bioethicists would respectively address: value judgements; societal consequences; and 
harm/benefit analysis (Browne 2015, 14-16). She concretely illustrates these debates in her 
account of a hypothetical Panel discussion of PMDD. The diagnosis is a DSM-5 category 
which Browne believes should be discontinued, and which she argues would have been 
vetoed by the Panel, had it existed: “it is most likely that a panel of philosophers, sociologists 
and bioethicists would have rejected the proposal to list PMDD as a diagnosis in DSM-5” 
(Browne 2015, 23). Note the counterfactual conditional: an important, concrete element in 
Browne’s case for the Panel is the inference that, had the Panel existed, it would have 
rejected PMDD for valid reasons. While I concur with analysis that regards counterfactual 
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reasoning as essential, though often implicit, to historiography (e.g. Bunzl 2004), I believe 
that there are least two problems in Browne’s argument by counterfactual history. 
The first problem is the selection of PMDD. It is not explained why PMDD should be 
particularly useful for her historical argument. This is a significant omission because the 
history of Homosexuality in DSM, and a corresponding counterfactual history, would seem a 
better-informed alternative. There is a growing body of material that refers specifically to 
Homosexuality in DSM (e.g. Bayer 1981, Drescher and Merlino 2007), beyond the brief 
intra-professional historiography that Browne cites (Zachar and Kendler 2012), and an 
indefinitely large hinterland of social and cultural histories of gay rights and activism. In 
particular, a discussion of Homosexuality would have allowed Browne to identify what 
functions of “protests and political activism” could have been taken on by the Panel. Since 
there is, for instance, no well-known equivalent of the Stonewall riots for PMDD, Browne’s 
counterfactual history leaves unclear precisely what the Panel would be taking over from the 
political and public spheres. The suspicion therefore arises that Browne’s choice of PMDD 
stacks the deck in her favor: since no substantive actual (i.e. non-counterfactual) history of 
PMDD is provided by Browne, one cannot readily discern, for instance, whether the Panel’s 
deliberations are an unlikely or improper substitute for “protests and political activism”. 
Moreover, Browne’s selection of a currently contentious diagnostic category poses a problem 
to readers who disagree with her conclusions on PMDD’s validity. Those who have come (as 
they see it rationally) to a different (e.g. biomedical) conclusion about PMDD are confronted 
with a counterfactual history in which the Panel comes to precisely the wrong conclusion. If 
they accept Browne’s historiography, but reject her nosology, then they will oppose her 
proposal. Choosing an uncontentious invalid category such as Homosexuality would have 
circumvented this obstacle. 
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 The second problem is that Browne’s discussion of the Panel’s hypothetical 
deliberations simultaneously presents her case for the removal of PMDD from DSM-5. Two 
kinds of argumentative validity are therefore mixed indiscriminately. In one strand of 
argument, Browne contends that PMDD should not have been included in DSM-5. This is 
most apparent when she seems at points to be writing in her own voice, rather than 
constructing a valid historical argument. Consider a statement such as: “The PMDD label 
thus has the potential to stigmatise not only those women given the label but, given the social 
biases that exist regarding gender worldwide, there is the risk that it may stigmatise and harm 
all women” (Browne 2015, 23). Regardless of Browne’s intentions, this sentence is easily 
(and perhaps correctly) apprehended in context as her inference about PMDD, rather than her 
inference about the course of a hypothetical Panel debate on PMDD. The unfortunate 
rhetorical effect is to muddle the validity of her views on PMDD with the validity of her 
historical argument. I found much that was convincing in Browne’s feminist argument that 
PMDD is something like a highly contingent, culturally specific Western idiom of distress, “a 
normal and understandable reaction to stressful circumstances”, rather than a “medical 
problem” (Browne 2015, 22). But I also found myself at first persuaded, then dissuaded and 
irritated, by the halo effect that emanates from this argument, and which colored my initial 
reading of her historiography.  
Browne’s counterfactual history is tacit at the beginning of her discussion of PMDD, 
since she writes initially in the second conditional (i.e. “if there were a Panel, it would …”), 
and seems to be offering a prediction about what the Panel would do if implemented in the 
present: “If a proposal to upgrade PMDD to a full category was put to the Panel, the Panel 
would then set to work identifying and examining the value judgements inherent to the 
proposal and predicting possible consequences” (Browne 2015, 21). But by the concluding 
paragraph, it is evident that Browne regards these predictions as equivalent to a 
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counterfactual history of the recent past. Browne offers a number of significant statements in 
the third conditional (i.e. “if there had been a Panel, it would have …”): “Those trained in 
philosophy, sociology and bioethics would have raised the issues and potential harms of the 
PMDD diagnosis highlighted above. These would have been weighed against the potential 
benefits”; “On this analysis it is most likely that a panel of philosophers, sociologists and 
bioethicists would have rejected the proposal to list PMDD as a diagnosis in DSM-5” 
(Browne 2015, 23). Browne’s historiographical vacillation presumably relies upon a silent 
inference that the present and the recent past are sufficiently similar historical contexts for her 
argument. For the sake of simplicity, I will accept this equivalence, and treat her discussion 
as an exercise consistently in the counterfactual history provided in her final paragraph.  
Because Browne tends to confound historical and ethical validity claims, her 
presentation and rebuttal of counter-arguments is limited to her conclusions about PMDD, 
and nowhere extends to her historical conclusions about the deliberations of the Panel. 
Nosology is dignified with argument, but history receives only assertions about what is 
“likely”. Thus, with respect to biomedical rather than psychosocial explanation of PMDD, 
Browne writes: “Given the absence of verified associated biomarkers […], I would not think 
it likely that the Panel would be convinced on this point” (Browne 2015, 21). Browne 
assumes that the counterfactual events would be determined purely by the rationality (as she 
sees it) of the actors. Even if we accept for the sake of argument the validity of Browne’s 
case regarding PMDD, it is a non sequitur to suppose that the deliberations of any actual 
Panel would be as rational. Browne has to show that the (putative) rational structure of the 
Panel discussion would also be historically probable. At an abstract level, Browne proposes 
various safeguards to maximize rationality, such as state sponsorship to ensure that the public 
are the primary stakeholder, an appointment process that favors expert heterogeneity, and the 
capacity to invite external specialists when dealing with particularly recondite issues (Browne 
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2015, 17-19). However, none of these mechanisms are specified in the concrete 
counterfactual history of PMDD, which invites suspicion that they lack credibility when 
applied in particular contexts (for instance, one might wonder what would prevent the Panel 
selecting experts that confirmed its biases, or what would happen if the heterogeneous experts 
ended up in deadlock, unable to give a majority view) – and this is to say nothing of new 
“what ifs” that might be generated in a concrete, closely argued and counter-argued 
counterfactual account of the Panel deliberating PMDD. 
 There is, though, one sense in which Browne’s counterfactual history sets the bar too 
high for her overall argument. Browne needn’t show the historical probability of a Panel 
rejecting PMDD for good reasons. She merely has to show that, all in all, the Panel is an 
improvement upon things as they stand. But this means something more than merely showing 
the problems within the APA’s current measures (Browne 2015, 24-26). It brings me back to 
the mystery that I noted in the beginning of this commentary. Browne states that “it should 
not be necessary to have protests and political activism, such as that involved in removing 
homosexuality from the DSM, in order for the status quo to be reassessed” (Browne 2015, 
13). Browne may indeed be correct, but she needs to establish in greater detail what she takes 
to be deficient in protests and political activism as a means of exerting pressure on the DSM. 
Without clarity on this premise, it is unclear why the Panel is better overall. Otherwise, the 
Panel seems perhaps not an improvement, but merely the kind of thing that appeals to 
philosophers, sociologists, bioethicists, and others who find the seminar room congenial. 
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